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In a free society governed by the rule of law and the constitution, there
must always be a line between vigorous prosecution and official mis-
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, a number of cases have surfaced which allege abuse
of prosecutorial discretion, perhaps none more notorious and disturbing than the
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matter of Rolando Cruz. On November 4, 1995, Rolando Cruz was released from
prison after twice being convicted and sentenced to death.' Cruz served more than
ten years on death row for a murder he did not commit. Prosecutors charged Cruz
and co-defendant Alejandro Hernandez2 for the brutal abduction, rape, and murder
of 10-year-old Jeanine Nicarico based primarily upon a "vision statement" Cruz
allegedly gave to detectives during the initial murder investigation.' In the vision
statement police claim Cruz told them that he dreamed of the victim's murder and
disclosed details only the killer could have known.4 Prosecutors did not disclose the
statement to the defense attorneys until four days before the first trial.5
Prosecutors ignored conclusions of the Illinois State Police that another man,
Brian Dugan, committed the crime.6 Instead, they chose to charge Cruz and
Hernandez, Hispanic males, despite a confession from Dugan who admitted killing
the victim and that he acted alone.7 Dugan also provided disturbing details of the
murder to solidify the credibility of his confession.8 Prosecutors knew that Dugan
was serving two life sentences for the abduction, rape, and murder of a 7-year-old
girl as well as a nurse.' For years, prosecutors failed to disclose to defense
attorneys notes of Dugan's oral statement and his offer to give a written confession
if prosecutors did not seek the death penalty.' °
1. Dennis Conrad, Court Oks 3rd Trial of Man in Killing Another Admitted, St. Louis Post
Dispatch, July 15, 1994, at C2. And for a detailed account of the events surrounding the matter of
Rolando Cruz see Eric Herman, Conspiracy Theory, The American Lawyer, Mar. 1998, at 74-82.
2. David Heckelman, Cruz' Death Sentence Upheld, Chi. Daily L Bull., Dec. 4, 1992, at 3 (A
third co-defendant, Stephen Buckley, was also charged and tried for the murder of Jeanine Nicarico.
However, the jury could not reach a verdict as to his charges, and prosecutors later dropped all charges
against him.).
3. Gera-Lind Kolarik, DNA, Changed Testimony Gain Acquital: Special Prosecutor, FBI
Investigating Controversial Illinois Murder Prosecutor, 82 A.B.AJ. 34 (1996).
4. Patricia Manson, Cruz Told Grand Jurors About 'Vision' Panel Members Say, Chi. Daily
L. Bull., May 20, 1999, at 3. (A police officer testified that Cruz indicated he had a dream about the
victim being struck on the head. He also testified that Cruz said he dreamed that the blows were so hard
that the victim's head left an impression in the ground.) Id. See also Herman, supra note 1, at 79-80.
(Special prosecutor William Kunlde believed that police officers and prosecutors fabricated the vision
statement to support a weak circumstantial case. To support his conclusion, he pointed to the fact that
there were no written notes about the vision; when Cruz gave tape-recorded confession, he made no
mention of having a dream about the murder; officers who allegedly received the statement about the
vision did not tell other officers working on the case.).
5. Patricia Manson, Defense Builds Fence to Trap Cruz in His Field of 'Dreams,' Chi. Daily
L. Bull.. May 19, 1999, at 3; Kolarik, supra note 3, at 34.
6. Allan H. Gray & Courtenay Edelhart, Judge Rules Cruz Innocent; Finally, 'The Whole Case
Just Fell Apart,' Chi. Trib.. Nov. 4, 1995, at 1; Herman, supra note 1, at 79.
7. Kolarik, supra note 3, at 34.
8. See Herman, supra note 1, at 79. (Edward Ciscowski, a commander with the Illinois State
Police, interviewed Dugan about his involvement in the murder. In addition to providing impressive
details of the murder, Dugan gave nine separate statements about killing Nicarico, including a lie
detector test and a statement given under hypnosis. From this information Ciscowski concluded that
Dugan acted alone in killing the victim. Prosecutors simply chose to ignore this evidence).
9. Kolarik, supra note 3, at 34.
10. Patricia Manson, CruzLawyer: Never GotNotes on 'OtherSuspect,' Chi. Daily L Bull., Apr.
23, 1999, at I (Lawyers for Rolando Cruz did not discover that there might be another suspect until a
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An assistant attorney general assigned to defend the court's imposition of
Cruz's second death sentence resigned, indicating that if jurors had heard the
information pertaining to Dugan's criminal history and confession, they could not
have concluded that anyone other than Brian Dugan committed the murder." She
indicated that she could not ethically continue to pursue the unjust prosecution and
execution of Rolando Cruz.'
2
The appellate court ruled the trial judge improperly excluded Dugan's
confession and past crimes and granted a third trial.'3 It was during this last trial
that the case against Cruz began to unravel. DNA tests excluded Cruz and his co-
defendant as having raped Jeanine Nicarico and nearly conclusively identified
Dugan, a white male, as the perpetrator. 4 Several witnesses who had previously
provided damaging testimony for the prosecution recanted.'" Most unsettling,
however, is that a sheriff's lieutenant who had previously confirmed that Cruz gave
the vision statement also recanted, indicating that his colleagues had never told him
of Cruz' s dream about the murder.'6 These events lead the judge to acquit Cruz and
call for a special prosecutor.'7
In an extraordinary move, the special prosecutor initially indicted three
prosecutors and four sheriff s deputies known as the "Dupage 7" for conspiracy to
commit official misconduct and conspiracy to obstruct justice in the prosecution
of Rolando Cruz."s While prosecuting law enforcement officials for alleged
wrongdoing in the performance of their duties is an unusual occurrence, bringing
criminal charges against prosecutors for official misconduct in performing their
duties is virtually unknown.' 9 In fact, this appears to be the first criminal trial in the
nation involving allegations that prosecutors engaged in criminal acts to send a
defendant to death row.20
An important question is how prosecutors, who are the gatekeepers for
upholding justice as well as citizens' rights, were able to violate the rights of
Rolando Cruz and his co-defendant for so long without effective scrutiny and with
newspaper article suggested that another man claimed to be the killer. After an investigation, Cruz's
lawyers received hundreds of documents related to Dugan as a result of discovery requests submitted
to Dupage County prosecutors. However, prosecutors did not include a set of handwritten notes
regarding a meeting with Dugan and his attorneys. Dugan gave a hypothetical confession because he
wanted immunity from the death penalty.).
11. Mark Hensen, A Prosecutor's Duty: AssistantA. G. Resigns Rather Than Defend Conviction
She Feels is Wrong, 78 A.B.A.J. 28 (1992).
12. Id.
13. Conrad, supra note 1, at C2.
14. Herman, supra note 1, at 78.
15. Kolarik, supra note 3, at 34.
16. Darryl Van Duch, Ten Years Later, Officer Recants: Accused Killer, Once on Death Row,
Freed in 3d Trial, Nat'l. U., Nov. 20, 1995, at A6.
17. Herman, supra note 1, at 76-77.
18. See People v. Vosburge et al, Nos. 96 CF, 2586-2592.
19. Mark Hansen, How a Vision Failed: Indictment Calls Prosecution a Conspiracy Against
Suspect, 83 A.B.A.J. 26 (1997).
20. Patricia Manson, Cruz Case RiggedNot Bungled: Kunkle, Chi. Daily L. Bull., May 28,1999,
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nearly tragic consequences. An obvious answer points to the almost complete
autonomy both state and federal prosecutors possess, particularly as it relates to
charging.
The prosecutor's decision as to whether or not to charge a suspect is virtually
unchecked by formal constraints on regulatory mechanisms,2 making it one of the
broadest discretionary powers in criminal administration.22 For federal prosecutors
this expansive power began with the inception of the office, when the Judiciary Act
of 1789 directed the president to appoint an attorney for each federal judicial
district.23 For more than forty years U.S. Attorneys functioned without supervision
by an executive agency, laying the foundation for the U.S. Attorneys' present
autonomy.2
For state prosecutors, power was a little more difficult to garner. American
courts' attempt to implement the English system of private prosecution proved to
be demanding and costly. 5 There was little need for criminal lawyers in court,
since the American judicial system initially denied counsel to felons. 26 As a result,
private prosecution was both time consuming and expensive for prosecutors who
were required to hire a lawyer to conduct preliminary stages of the prosecution as
well as the trial itself.27 Once the colonies established the office of the Attorney
General, however, public prosecution replaced private prosecution, primarily
through county officials.2" Under this system, it became clear that local prosecutors
21. James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 4 Duke L.J. 651,
652, 679-681 (1976) [hereinafter Narrowing Discretion].
22. Robert L. Minser, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 717,
741 (1996). (The prosecutor's office has become the most powerful office in the criminal justice system,
particularly in the areas of charging, plea bargaining and sentencing.) Vorenberg, supra note 21, at 678;
Frank Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect With a Crime 151-350 (1969).
23. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 72, 92-93 (1789). (The Judiciary Act also provided for the appointment of
the Attorney General to represent the United States in litigation before the Supreme Court and provide
legal advice to the President and Department heads.)
24. United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters 95-150, U.S.
Attorneys: More Accountabilityfor Implementing Priority Programs Is Desirable 4 (1995) [hereinafter
GAO/GGD 95-150]; P.S. Kane, Why Have You Singled Me Out?, The Use of Prosecutorial Discretion
for Selective Prosecution, 67 Tul. L Rev. 2293, 2294-95 (1993); Norman Abrams, Internal Policy:
Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1971).
25. For a detailed historical account of the state prosecutors rise to power see Minser, supra note
22, at 728-32.
26. Id. at 729.
27. Homer S. Cummings & Carl McFarland, Federal Justice 13 (1937); Minser, supra note 22,
at 729 n.69.
28. Minser, supra note 22, at 729 (indicating that during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries, each colony established the office of the Attorney General. Its duties included the presentment
of criminal indictments. By the time of the American Revolution, public prosecution replaced private
prosecution through county officials. Some officials were deputies of the state attorney general who
were nominated by the county court. They received little supervision from the attorney general. Other
deputies operated with direct supervision, and others were county officials nominated by the local
courts.). See Cummings & McFarland, supra note 27, at 13.
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were simply adjuncts to the local courts.29 Criminal prosecutions shifted power
from the local prosecutor to the local sheriff and coroner.'3
In 1832, states began to include within their constitution, provisions for
election of local prosecutors. 3' The result was expansion of the local prosecutors'
power, primarily because they were no longer beholden to the opinions and politics
of those who had appointed them. 32 The state prosecutor emerged as an executive
official charged with using his discretion to apply local standards in enforcing local
laws.33 Eventually, the prosecutor's absolute discretion in the execution of its
powers and the lack of professionalism in the prosecutor's office alarmed
government commissions and legal scholars.' Crime commissions across the
country scrutinized the local prosecutors offices and found that insufficient checks
upon prosecutorial discretion existed in the system. 35 Despite this finding, however,
little has changed, and prosecutors continue to amass and exercise power without
any significant accountability.
Despite the laws which enable federal and state prosecutors to exist and carry
out the criminal laws for the benefit of an ordered society, several scholars have
argued that prosecutors' broad power, particularly as it relates to charging deci-
sions, resulted not from any conscious legislative decision that prosecutors should
enjoy such powers, 36 but merely by default.37 However the power developed, its
29. Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor: A Search for Identity 19 (1980).
30. Id.
31. Minser, supra note 22, at 729. Minser notes that the democratic zeal leading to the expansion
of suffrage in the American republic from 1820 until just before the Civil War sparked the movement
to elect local officials, including judges. After it became customary to elect local judges, it also became
customary to elect the prosecuting attorney. Id.; Jacoby, supra note 29, at 24-26.
32. Jacoby, supra note 29, at 25, 38; Abraham Goldstein, History of the Public Prosecutor, in
3 Encyclopedia of Crime & Just. 1288 (Sanford Kodish ed. 1983). Professor Goldstein notes that the
change in public and judicial perceptions of the local prosecutor from a low level judicial official to a
member of the executive branch, was reflected in the new state constitution, which listed the
prosecuting attorney as a member of the executive branch along with other local government officials.
33. Minser, supra note 22, at 729-30.
34. Id. at 730 n.80. See National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement Report on
Prosecution 14-15 (1931) (describing close connection between criminal justice and local politics
during the early twentieth century.).
35. Jacoby, supra note 29, at 31. See also National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement, supra note 34, at 15-16 (indicating that the prosecutor's office was generally filled by
ambitious beginners who used the office as a stepping-stone to practice. The report also noted that the
insufficient checks on prosecutorial discretion was "ideally adapted to misgovernment").
36. Misner, supra note 22, at 743. (noting that theoretically, criminal law policy is made by the
legislature and implemented by the police, prosecutors, courts, and prisons. Since common law crimes
have been abated and courts can no longer create new crimes to meet new challenges, the center for
policy-making should be in the legislature. In reality, the legislature has relinquished much of its power
to the prosecutor. For instance, prosecutors decide whether to charge, whether to prosecute, and the
length of sentence. The prosecutor emerges as the real policy maker in the criminal justice system. As
a result, the legislature is, at best, a lesser partner whose role is to set the outer parameters of criminal
law policy and fund prisons.). See also Abraham S. Goldstein, The Passive Judiciary: Prosecutorial
Discretion and the Guilty Plea 52-75 (1981) (arguing that it is preferable to follow the common law
development of rules for use of prosecutorial discretion rather than attempting to establish guidelines
2000]
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breadth and scope have troubled commentators and scholars for many years.3"
Indeed, no valid purpose is served by affording prosecutors so much discretion.39
With such broad, unchecked power comes the potential for abuse in the form of
discriminatory charging based on impermissible grounds, including race.
This article examines the current standard of prosecutorial discretion and
resulting claims of selective prosecution, particularly as these factors relate to race.
Part 11, while acknowledging that some prosecutorial discretion is necessary for an
efficient and effective criminal justice system, analyzes the reasons historically
given for granting prosecutors almost absolute discretion, especially as it relates to
charging or refusing to charge an individual with a crime. It notes the existence of
ethical and systemic checks that discourage prosecutors from abusing their
authority as well as the existence of certain protections for the accused when a
prosecutor charges forimpermissible reasons. However, this section concludes that
the present constraints and remedies are ineffective in preventing abuse of
discretionary power.
Part Ell uses United States v. Armstrong to illustrate the stronghold prosecutors
maintain in relation to whom to charge and in what jurisdiction to charge them. The
article notes that a decision to charge a defendant in federal rather than state court
substantially increases the penalty for the accused. It also argues that race matters
when prosecutors make such decisions. This section also discusses specifically the
Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which limits a defendant's right to seek discovery from the government
in connection with an allegation of selective prosecution. Through this holding, the
Court may have unwittingly created a new "constitutionally related"
supplementation to the rule, which could have consequences far beyond selective
prosecution claims.' More importantly, however, the Court's decision may leave
undiscoverable materials tending to exculpate a defendant.
Part IV examines suggestions for resolving the problem of unchecked
prosecutorial discretion, but concludes that most are unlikely to detect or control
prosecutions motivated by discriminatory purpose or mere abuse of power.
However, recent proposals calling for direct oversight of prosecutors' officers and
for the award of monetary compensation to the defendant who has been
unsuccessfully prosecuted as a result of an impermissible charge, may prove
through the rule-making process); and Kenneth Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 189
(1969).
37. Vorenberg, supra note 21, at 678-82.
38. See Thurman W. Arnold, Law Enforcement: An Attempt at Social Discretion, 42 Yale LJ.
7, 17-18 (1932) (arguing that virtual unreviewability of the prosecutor's authority borders on anarchy);
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. Crim. L. &Criminology 3, 5 (1940) (noting that ifa prosecutor
can choose his cases, he can also choose his defendants. This is the most dangerous power of the
prosecutor because he might pick people he thinks he should get rather that picking cases that need to
be prosecuted.). See also Packer, The Limits ofthe Criminal Sanctions 290-91 (1968) (noting that the
need for discretion is not a virtue. Rather it is lawless because a prosecutor has the ability to pick and
choose whom to prosecute.).
39. Vorenberg, supra note 21, at 680.
40. Unites States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 454, 471, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1489 (1996).
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sufficient to prevent malicious and unwarranted prosecutions. In extreme cases of
abuse of prosecutorial powers, as in the case of Rolando Cruz, prosecutors should
not be immune from criminal prosecution.
11. THE CONTINUUM OF PROSECUTORIAL CHARGING DECISIONS
Although the unbridled discretion granted to prosecutors in the charging
process can lead to abuses, prosecutors nonetheless need to be entrusted with some
degree of discretion for the criminal justice system to function efficiently. This
section examines critically the reasons typically advanced for allowing prosecutors
discretion in deciding when, what, and whom to charge.
A. The Need for Limited Discretion in Charging
The decision to charge an individual with a particular crime is a critical step
in the criminal justice process." In determining whether to charge and what to
charge, the prosecutor must assess whether a particular set of facts fits within the
criminal code,42 weighing the strengths of the case and determining whether the
alleged perpetrator is guilty or innocent. 3 Even when the circumstances point to
guilt, prosecutors must consider the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a
conviction." And even if the evidence proves sufficient, the determination must be
made whether criminal sanctions are appropriate or criminal prosecution is in the
community's best interest.4' All of these decisions are currently left to the
prosecutor's discretion.
Among the principal reasons advanced for allowing the prosecutor such
discretion is that it serves to mitigate the ill effects of the trend toward legislative
over-criminalization. According to this view, prosecutorial discretion functions as
a kind of safety valve that alleviates the pressures of a criminal code that tends to
make a crime of everything that people find objectionable, but which fails to take
into account issues of enforceability or changing social mores.' Thus, while many
states criminalize most forms of gambling, the enforcement of these gambling laws
depends very much on the circumstances of the particular case, there being, for
41. Yale Kamisar, et al., Modem Criminal Procedure 895-96(8th ed. 1994); Task Force Report,
The Courts 5 (1967) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
42. Kamisar et al., supra note 41, at 859-96.
43. See Task Force Report, supra note 41, at 7; Kamisaret al., supra note 41, at 895-96 (1994).
44. Kamisar et al., supra note 41, at 895-896.
45. Id.; see also George T. Frampton, Jr., Some Practical and Ethical Problems of Prosecuting
Public Officials. 36 Md. L Rev. 5, 21 (1976).
46. See Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 Am. J. Comp.
L. 532, 533 (1970); see also Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Procedure
678-79 (5th ed. 1996); Minser, supra note 22, at 745. Professor Minser argues that the breadth of crime
definition is a major source of prosecutorial power. He notes: "By choosing to create a large number
of crimes, and by defining those crimes with the breadth proposed by the Model Penal Code,
legislatures make it impossible to enforce all criminal statutes, and, at the same time, make it possible
for a single act to be charged under many overlapping provisions." Id. at 745-46.
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example, a general feeling that the legislature never intended to proscribe private
gambling among friends.47 Other laws, such as adultery statutes, are passed as
"state-declared ideals." These statutes are "unenforced because we want to
continue our conduct and [are] unrepealed because we want to preserve our
morals."4 Still other criminalized activities were enacted into law in the heat of a
certain moment in time, when a particular mood dominated a tribunal or legislature
or as a response to public reaction to a particular event.49 These archaic laws whose
"time has passed" go unenforced, yet remain on the books for a variety of reasons,
not least of which is the general public's ignorance of their very existence and
consequential indifference to their repeal."°
Clearly, some degree of prosecutorial discretion is desirable to avoid clogging
the justice system with criminal prosecutions that are incompatible with current
social views or goals. Prosecutors' offices are already heavily overworked. To
require the mandatory charging of all offenses within the criminal code would drive
them to the breaking point and make effective law enforcement virtually impos-
sible.
An equally defensible reason for allowing a limited degree of prosecutorial
discretion is essentially economic in nature. The government simply does not have
sufficient resources to investigate, charge, and prosecute all offenses which come
to its attention.5 Were society willing to pay for more police officers, prosecutors,
public defenders, judges, courtrooms, and prisons, the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion would be less justifiable. Since society has been unwilling to pay for full
enforcement, the government must have some discretion in determining what cases
to charge.
B. Is There Justification for Broad Discretion?
Notwithstanding the necessity for some discretion in charging, the focus of
inquiry is whether the expansive discretionary power as currently exercised is
necessary or desirable. Three justifications are generally proffered to support the
prosecutor's wide breadth of decision-making power.
One reason that is advanced for giving prosecutors great latitude when
discharging their duties is that they are designated by statute as agents of the
executive branch responsible for law enforcement.52 As such, they assist the
president in discharging his constitutional responsibility to "take Care that the Laws
47. LaFave, supra note 46, at 533.
48. Saltzburg & Capra, supra note 46, at 628.
49. LaFave, supra note 46, at 533.
50. Id. at 533. Saltzburg & Capra, supra note 46, at 628 (noting that it is difficult to gain support
to repeal sodomy laws even though there is a large number of citizens engaging in the proscribed
behavior).
51. LaFave, supra note 46, at 533-34.
52. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S. Ct. 1524, 1530 (1985).
[Vol; 60
SHELBYA. DICKERSON MOORE
be faithfully executed."53 In order to facilitate the execution of that duty, the
government must retain broad discretion to enforce the country's criminal laws.'
Along with the responsibility for law enforcement is a corresponding potential
immunity from significant judicial review of a prosecutor's power to decide
independently which crimes to prosecute and which charges to file. Such immunity
exits under a theory of separation of powers.55
Others argue that the efficient management of the criminal justice system
militates against substantial judicial review of prosecutorial charging decisions.56
Such review would unduly burden the criminal process, causing further delay in
already protracted criminal proceedings.57 Ifjudicial review of a charging decision
were readily available, many defendants would seek it primarily to delay the
criminal proceeding."
Finally, broad prosecutorial discretion is often justified on the grounds that
prosecutors need to individualize justice. The prosecutor is in the best position and
has the expertise to make the complex charging decisions that are necessary in an
individualized criminal justice system.59 Individualizedjustice permits aprosecutor
to look at the specifics of a given case and proceed fairly based on the facts and
circumstances of each case.' In order to make decisions which are fair and
equitable, a prosecutor must weigh the evidence in each case and decide how best
to expend limited resources based upon the severity of each crime and the
probability of convicting the defendant.6' If prosecutors are required to act within
strict accordance with the precise and narrow rules of law, the criminal law would
be ordered but intolerable.62 Further, since judges do not possess the necessary
53. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. The Constitution grants the executive branch the power and
responsibility for law enforcement.
54. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607, 105 S. Ct. at 1530.
55. See United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1307 (5th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of
separation of powers, see, for example, Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 1472, 1521 (1988) [hereinafter Race and the Criminal Process]; Kane, supra note 24,
at 2293, 2309; James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1521,
1545-54 (1981); Gifford, Equal Protection and the Prosecutor's Charging Decision: Enforcing an
Ideal, 49 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 659,682-83 (1981); see also Goldstein, supra note 36, at 5,51-58,67-69;
Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: the Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 Ford. L. Rev. 13,
20 (1998); Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: the Needfor
Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. Pa. L Rev. 1309, 1326 (1997).
56. Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 55, at 1521; Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607, 105 S. Ct.
at 1530.
57. United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Pell, J., dissenting).
58. Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 55, at 1521.
59. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-08, 105 S. Ct. at 1530; Race and the Criminal Process, supra
note 55, at 1521; Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1365, 1368 n. 10 (1987); Vorenberg, supra note 55, at 1545-54; LaFave, supra note 46,
at 533-34.
60. LaFave, supra note 46, at 534-35.
61. Id. at 534-35.
62. Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in America 67 (1930).
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level of expertise, they should avoid reviewing a prosecutor's discretionary
exercise in charging.63
The foregoing reasons represent some compelling justifications for continuing
to permit broad prosecutorial decision-making power. However, the danger of such
broad, unrestrained power is that it is subject to abuse by prosecutors who may
select defendants on impermissible grounds including race. No compelling
argument can be made to support nearly absolute discretionary power, lacking
formal checks by outside mechanisms.
C. Restraints on Broad Discretionary Power
Arguably, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion does not exist without
constraints. There are several checks, which, in theory, exist to assure that the
decisions concerning whether to charge a defendant are not arbitrary or violative
of an accused's constitutional rights." Even if a prosecutor's abuse of charging
power initially goes undetected, the subsequent grandjury indictment, trial process,
and jury are processes designed to detect and prevent such abuses. These checks,
in conjunction with the prosecutor's adherence to high ethical standards, are
supposed to ensure that, regardless of race or socioeconomic or other status,
miscarriages of justice do not occur.65
The National District Attorney Association (NDAA) National Prosecutor
Standards provide that a prosecutor should exercise discretion to file only those
charges consistent with the interests of justice." Similar rules, designed to reduce
the likelihood that prosecutors will convict those who are innocent,67 are found in
the American Bar Association (ABA) Ethics and Professional Responsibility
Committee's Model of Professional Conduct and the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function. For example, the ABA
Standard for Criminal Justice § 3-3.9 provides:
(a) A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit
the continued pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor knows
that the charges are not supported by probable cause. A prosecutor should
not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued charges in the
absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support the conviction.
(b) ... Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly
consider in exercising his or her discretion are:
63. Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 55, at 1521.
64. See Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, The Racial Justice Act of 1994: Undermining
Enforcement of the Death Penalty Without Promoting Racial Justice, 20 U. Dayton L. Rev. 655,674-
77 (1995) (rejecting the need for the Racial Justice Act and noting the protections afforded minority
defendants in the event a prosecutor abuses her discretion in charging capital cases).
65. See E. Michael McCann, Opposing Capital Punishment: A Prosecutor's Perspective, 79
Marq. L Rev. 649, 658-59 (1996).




(1) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact
guilty[.168
Section 3-3.11 further provides:
(a) A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make timely disclosure
to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of all
evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigate the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the
punishment of the accused.
(b) A prosecutor should not fail to make a reasonably diligent effort to
comply with a legally proper discovery request.
(c) A prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence
because he or she believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid the
accused.69
These national standards, as well as relevant state provisions, are designed to
ensure that prosecutors act with scrupulous honesty." If these directives are
followed, prosecutors should not proceed without solid evidence of guilt, fail to
disclose exculpatory evidence, or knowingly use false evidence or testimony'
While prosecutors must exercise discretion under these circumstances, they ought
to be guided by ethical constraints reducing the probability that citizens will be
wrongly charged and prosecuted.
Systemic controls also serve to restrain prosecutorial powers. One structural
control against unwarranted prosecution exists in the grand jury. When the
government seeks an indictment, it must make apresentment to a grand jury, which
has been regarded historically as a primary protection for the innocent. 2 As the
Supreme Court has noted, "[I]t serves the invaluable function in our society of
standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual,
minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or
was instead the result of an intimidating power, malice, or personal ill will." In
essence, the grand jury is supposed to serve as the gatekeeper of citizens' rights to
assure that no one is wrongly charged and convicted.'
D. Ineffectiveness of Present Restraints on Broad Discretionary Power
Although there are ethical codes and systemic constraints governing
prosecutorial conduct, they do not adequately address the issues in U.S. v.
Armstrong, nor can these controls eliminate the subjective factors and external
68. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function §3-3.9-11 (3d ed.
1993) [hereinafter Prosecution Function]; McCann, supra note 65, at 658.
69. Prosecution Function, supra note 68, at §3-3.11.
70. McCann, supra note 65, at 661.
71. Id.
72. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364 (1962).




forces which contribute to the prosecutor's decision to charge. Individualized
justice, though theoretically justifiable, runs counter to a fundamental concept in
American law: that all citizens ought to be treated equally under the law." Also
inherent in the concept of individualized justice is the disparate treatment of some
citizens. These factors bolster the argument that prosecutors should not have
complete autonomy.
Although most prosecutors act in good faith, seeking to properly balance the
duty to uphold the oath of office with the responsibility to act fairly and equitably
when exercising that duty, errors in charging may occur. These errors may result
when an inexperienced prosecutor is unable to independently determine the
credibility of witnesses and the quality of evidence.76 Other prosecutors may not
have the knowledge, energy, time, skill, or patience to scrutinize witnesses and may
instead rely on police reports rather than conduct their own independent
investigation.7 The result of such errors is that an innocent person might be
charged and subsequently convicted.
More troubling are errors in judgment that spring from the close relationships
that prosecutors necessarily develop with law enforcement officers. On the one
hand, this relationship may be salutary. Over time, experienced prosecutors learn
an officer's biases and prejudices as well as his character for honesty. They also
develop the ability to discover whether an officer has obtained a confession from
the accused by overreaching and whether the confession is reliable.78 However,
consistent interaction between police and prosecutors may also create problems.
Such contact can often lead to friendship with the officer that clouds a prosecutor's
ability to assess clearly whether an officer crossed legal boundaries in gaining a
confession or securing evidence used to charge, try, and ultimately convict an
accused.7 9 In the worst case, an innocent person may be wrongly accused and
convicted and imprisoned, and, in cases of capital murder, sentenced to death and
executedW0
Another danger of unchecked discretion is that a prosecutor may be guided
more by improper extraneous political pressures than by the legal and factual
considerations of a given case. For example, a prosecutor, motivated by community
pressure or political ambition, may inappropriately seek the death penalty. A
prosecutor motivated by ambition to gain a higher office or simply to maintain her
position may file unfounded charges or overcharge a case in order to invoke a
75. LaFave, supra note 46, at 535-36 (1970) (quoting Kenneth Davis, Discretionary Justice at
170):
The discretionary power to be lenient is an impossibility without a concomitant
discretionary power not to be lenient, and injustice for the discretionary power not to be
lenient is especially frequent; the power to be lenient is the power to discriminate.
76. McCann, supra note 65, at 661-63.
77. Id. at 664.





higher penalty.8' However, such decisions are rarely subject to review, and the
prosecutor's improper agenda is virtually impossible to substantiate.
Conversely, a prosecutor may refuse to indict a defendant whom he is legally
and ethically bound to charge. A telling example of this flip-side of prosecutorial
discretion arose in the context of the savings and loan scandal of the 1980s and
early 1990s. The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Texas allegedly refused
to expend resources for the investigation of bank fraud and embezzlement cases
even when it was clear that millions of dollars had already been lost and billions
were at stake." The reluctance to prosecute was attributable primarily to the U.S.
Attorney's desire to protect his friends and political connections from indictment.8 3
Had there been an independent system of oversight of the U.S. Attorney's policies
regarding these cases, many more defendants would have been properly indicted
and convicted for fraud and embezzlement, resulting in severe criminal as well as
civil punishment. Plainly, none of the arguments mustered in support of unfettered
prosecutorial discretion, whether based on the need for separation of powers,
governmental efficiency, or individualized justice, justifies this outcome.
The problems with prosecutorial discretion become even more ominous when
race enters the equation. As one prosecutor observed: "The impact of racism, when
present in a [prosecutor's] decision as to whom to charge, at what level to charge,
and whether to negotiate a lower charge.., cannot be exaggerated."" He further
noted that:
[W]e... cannot deny, that 114 years after the close of the War Between
the States and nearly 100 years after Strauder, racial and other forms of
discrimination still remain a fact of life, in the administration ofjustice as
in our society as a whole. Perhaps today that discrimination takes a form
more subtle than before. But it is not less real or pernicious.85
How charging decisions impact black defendants has been the topic of a
number of studies over the past twenty years. 6 A leading statistical study
81. Id.
82. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-1137, 98th Cong., at 124 (1984). In 1984, the House Committee on
Governmental Operations found that U.S. attorneys were not to expend resources on bank fraud
investigations. The House Committee also found that in 1983 the FBI, reduced by almost 15 percent
the number of agents assigned to investigating white collar crime, especially embezzlement and fraud,
and requested additional cuts in subsequent years. See also the Senate Banking Committee's testimony
for the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), noting that even when it was clear that billions of dollars
were being lost, government prosecutors did not issue one subpoena regarding the RTC (remarks of
Senator John Kerry), 140 Cong. Rec. 8192, 8192-93 (1991).
83. See Pete Brewton, The Mafia, CIA and George Bush 61-62 (1992); David Burnham, Above
the Law: Secret Deals, Political Fixes, and Other Misadventures of the U.S. Department of Justice 241
(1996).
84. McCann, supra note 65, at 675.
85. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558-59, 99 S. Ct. 2993, 3001-02 (1979).
86. Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Devastating Impact of the Justice System on the Status of
African-American Males: An Overview Perspective, 23 Cap. U. L. Rev. 23, 40 (1994); Race and the
Criminal Process, supra note 55, at 1525-29 (discussing multiple studies); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn
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conducted by Meyers and Hagan to determine whether prosecutors consider race
when deternining whether to proceed with the most severe charges found that
when a victim was white, prosecutors were more likely to pursue the highest
available charge."' In fact, where a high profile case involves a black defendant, a
prosecutor is more apt to seek the greatest penalty, particularly in homicide cases
where the victim is white.88
Other studies focusing on the prosecutor's initial assessment decision also
found discrimination based on race. For example, Spohn, Gruhl, and Welsh studied
the prosecutor's decision to reject felony charges against black, white, and
Hispanic defendants. The study revealed that prosecutors were statistically more
likely at the initial screening stage to reject charges against white defendants than
they were to reject charges against blacks and Hispanics.89
Even after a prosecutor makes a decision to charge, race continues to be a
factor in how prosecutors proceed with the case. A recent study, which examined
the screening and charging decisions in 881 sexual assault cases in a large
Midwestern city,' ° found that black men who assaulted white women were more
likely to have their cases filed as felonies and receive more serious charges.9' A
number of other studies evidence the link between race and disparity in charging
and sentencing a defendant. 2
The bottom line is that when prosecutors make charging decisions, race does
matter. And one cannot underestimate the impact a prosecutor's exercise of
discretion has on the outcome of a criminal case.93 A prosecutor has complete
discretion as to whether to dismiss a case or offer a plea. Unless a defendant can
convince a fact finder of his innocence, the charging decision generally determines
the outcome of the case.94 The federal sentencing guidelines and the corresponding
L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 L & Soc. Rev. 587, 615-19
(1985).
87. Weatherspoon, supra note 86, at 40; Martha A. Meyers & John A. Hogan, Prosecutors and
the Allocation of Court Resources, 26 Soc. Probs. 439, 446 (1979).
88. See Weatherspoon supra note 86, at 43; see also Bob Levenson & Debbie Salamore,
Prosecutors Seek Death Penalty in Black and White, Orlando Sentinel Trib., May 24, 1992, at Al;
Robert Bohn, Race and the Death Penalty in the United States, Race and Criminal Justice 71, 81
(Michael J. Lynch & E. Britt Patterson eds., 1991) (citing several studies involving state prosecutors
which find racial bias in prosecutorial decisions to charge a defendant with a capital crime).
89. See Cassia Spohn et al., The Impact of Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the Decision
to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 Criminology 175 (1987).
90. See Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 55, at 1527 and n.23; Gary D. LaFree, The
Effect of Sexual Stratification By Race on Official Reaction to Rape, 45 Am. Soc. Rev. 842, 844 (1980)
(In addition to felony screening and charging seriousness, the study examined the correlation between
race and arrest and verdict and sentence type.).
91. LaFree, supra note 90, at 844.
92. For a detailed look at other studies indicating that a defendant's sentencing severity is
dependent upon race, see Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 55, at 1525-35 & nn. 19-63;
Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94 Mich. L Rev. 1660,
1683 (1996).




mandatory minimum sentences further magnify the importance of the prosecutor's
initial decision to charge.95
Some argue that a series of protections eliminate racial bias in the criminal
process, particularly in capital cases.96 For example, the prosecutor cannot consider
race in charging.' Further, grand jurors who are citizens chosen on race-neutral
grounds, presumably will not sanction an indictment unless it is supported by the
evidence.9" Even after being charged, an accused may file a motion claiming
discriminatory prosecution." If he is unsuccessful and proceeds to trial on the
merits, he may seek a change of venue if he can demonstrate that he would be
unable to receive a fair trial due to racial bias in the community. " Jurors, too, must
be chosen on race-neutral grounds' and may be questioned about racial biases."°
Prosecutors cannot invoke race in arguing a case."° A defendant's conviction will
be overturned if he demonstrates that a prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent.
And the same National Prosecutors' Standards and ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice which call for prosecutors to act fairly and ethically under all circumstances
also require prosecutors to act without racial motivation when making decisions,
unless a crime is motivated by racial animus." In essence, the argument asserts
that even if a prosecutor's impermissible charging decision initially goes
undetected, all of these other checks serve as gatekeepers for the defendant's rights.
This approach to prosecutorial discretion is naive, however, because it ignores
the many ways in which a defendant's race subtly impacts the prosecutor's decision
to charge. In determining the likelihood of obtaining a guilty verdict, a prosecutor
typically evaluates the strength of the evidence, the victim's interest in prosecution,
and enforcement priorities.° 5 Unfortunately, while engaging in this process, such
seemingly "race-neutral" factors can have a discriminatory impact" if the
prosecutor subconsciously views a case involving a black defendant and a white
victim as more worthy of investigation and thus works more vigorously to uncover
95. Id.; see also infra Part M.
96. Lungren & Krotoski, supra note 64, at 674-77.
97. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S. Ct. 1524, 1530 (1985).
98. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986). For a history of the grand
jury, see R. Younger, The People's Panel 1-2 (1963).
99. But see infra Part m arguing that, due to evidentiary barriers, a defendant's right to file a
claim for racially selective prosecution offers little protection to a minority defendant.
100. See Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 1639 (1961).
101. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
102. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37, 106 S. Ct. 1683, 1688 (1986); see also Ristaino v.
Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596, 96 S. Ct. 1017, 1021 (1976).
103. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 1871 (1974).
104. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1762 (1987). Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939, 948, 103 S. Ct. 3418, 3423 (1983).
105. Davis, supra note 92, at 1679. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396,107 S.
Ct. 1187, 1182 (1987) (holding that prosecutors ought to be granted broad discretion since they must
evaluate the strength of the case as well as other enforcement policies).
106. Davis, supra note 92, at 1679. See also, Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 55, at
1520-27; Davis, supra note 55, at 34-38.
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evidence that will result in conviction. °7 A significant number of empirical studies
conducted over the last twenty years establish that cases involving black defendants
and white victims were prosecuted more vigorously than cases involving white
defendants and black victims." In fact, prosecutors sought more serious charges,
refused offers for pleas, and refused to dismiss charges during initial screening
more frequently when the defendant was black." 9
It is nearly impossible to detect malevolent racial bias, let alone subconscious
discrimination, particularly when the case presents facially viable reasons for
seeking an indictment against a minority defendant. Under the circumstances, the
notion that the grand jury serves as the protector of citizens' rights is highly
disputable. Some commentators and courts argue that the grand jury is simply an
arm of the prosecutor's office. In Hawkins v. Superior Court,"' for example, the
court expressed its scepticism of the grand jury process:
The prosecuting attorney is typically in complete control of the total
process in the grand jury room: he calls the witnesses, interprets the
evidence, states and applies the law, and advises the grand jury on
whether a crime has been committed. The grand jury is independent only
in the sense that it is not formally attached to the prosecutor's office;
though legally free to vote as they please, grand jurors virtually always
assent to the recommendations of the prosecuting attorney, a fact borne
out by available statistical and survey data. Indeed, the fiction of grand
jury independence is perhaps best demonstrated by the following fact to
which the parties herein have stipulated: between January 1, 1974, and
June 30, 1977, 235 cases were presented to the San Francisco grand jury
and indictments were returned in all 235."'
Even if the Hawkins court's view of the grand jury is cynical, that fact remains that
a symbiotic relationship between the grand jury and the prosecution effectively
prevents the grand jury from protecting citizens against racial bias. Only the
107. David C. Baldus et al., Equal Justice and the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis
(1990). It is important to note that prosecutors are usually white males, meaning that 70% of prosecutors
are male and 88% of prosecutors am white, non-Hispanic. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U. S. Depart.
of Justice, Prosecutors in State Courts 3 (1993); Davis, supra note 55, at 32-33 (indicating that while
"unconscious" racism may be less offensive than purposeful discrimination, it is no less harmless);
Sheri L Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 Cornell L Rev. 1016 (1988)
(exploring unconscious racism in criminal law decisions); Edward P. Boyle, Note, It's Not Easy Bein'
Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environmental Discrimination, and the ArgumentforModernizing
Equal Protection Analysis, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 937,939 (1993) (describing unconscious or "aversive'
racism).
108. See Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 55, at 1520-32 (discussing race and its
impact on the prosecutor's charging decision).
109. See supra notes 88-89; see also William J. Bowers et al., Legal Homicide 340-44 (1980);
William J. Bowers & Glenn L Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital
Statutes, 26 Crime & Delinq. 563, 612-14 (1980).




prosecutor and her witnesses appear before the grand jury. Prosecutors are
permitted to offer evidence that could not be offered at trial."' Prosecutors may
also use illegally seized evidence," 3 and, as the Supreme Court held in United
States v. Williams, prosecutors have no obligation to inform the grand jury of
evidence of a defendant's innocence, no matter how compelling." 4 The final result
is that the grand jury hears only one side of the evidence and reacts to that
presentation.
Once a defendant is charged, it is virtually impossible to prevent race from
entering other phases of the trial. The racial-neutrality argument does not prevent
a prosecutor from striking a potential juror because of his race while offering a
neutral pre-textual justification for the strike.' Along these same lines, a
prosecutor may choose a minority juror, believing that she is more likely to convict
a minority defendant. This conviction would be based not on the facts and
112. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S. Ct. 406 (1956) (holding that hearsay
evidence may be introduced to the grand jury as the basis of an indictment); Saltzburg & Capra, supra
note 46 at 708-09. Saltzburg & Capra note four reasons tending to support the holding in Costello:
First, ihadmissible evidence often has probative value, and the grand jury's function is
investigative, not adjudicative. Second, many evidentiary rules are designed to ensure
fairness in an adversary proceeding, and the grand jury is not adversarial. (Related to
this is the argument that a prosecutor cannot be expected to object to her own evidence,
and that the general rule is that, even at trial, evidence that is technically inadmissible
will be admitted if no objection is made). Third, any misleading effect of inadmissible
evidence will be remedied at trial. Fourth, grand jury proceedings would be greatly
burdened if the rules of evidence were applicable to them. The court would have to
review decisions as to the admissibility of evidence. In order to make relevance and
other rulings, supervising courts would have to ask grand juries why they wanted certain
evidence, and this might infringe upon the independence of the grand jury.
Id.; see also Davis, supra note 55, at 22 n.34; Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (And
Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 Corell L. Rev. 260, 266 n.24 (1995); Vorenburg, supra note 55, at
1537-38.
113. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974) (holding that illegally seized
evidence can be used for the basis of grand jury questioning and possibly as the basis for a grand jury
indictment).
114. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992) (holding that the rule
requiring prosecutors to present all substantial evidence exceeded the court's supervisory authority
because "the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do
not preside." Id. at 47, 112 S. Ct. at 1742.).
115. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106, 106 S. Ct. at 1728 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall
argued for eliminating peremptory strikes because of the possibility that prosecutors could make a
discriminatory decision and offer a race-neutral justification. He stated:
[Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial
courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons .... A prosecutor's own conscious
or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a prospective black
juror is "sullen," or "distant," a characterization that would not have come to his mind
if a white juror had acted identically. A judge's own conscious or unconscious racism
may lead him to accept such an explanation as well supported. As Justice Rehnquist
concedes, prosecutors' peremptory challenges are based on their "seat-of-the-pants
instincts" as to how particular jurors will vote.... Yet "seat-of-the-pants instincts" may
often be just another term for racial prejudice.
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evidence, but rather on the prosecutor's calculation that a juror will dislike a
defendant enough to convict him. An interesting example of this jury selection
strategy existed in the O.J. Simpson case." 6 Although advised to strike black
women from the jury, prosecutors opted to retain them, calculating, although
incorrectly, that black women's anger with O.J. Simpson's relationship with a
white woman and the black community's general rejection of the relationship
would lead to a conviction.
Prosecutors are easily able to circumvent the mandate not to invoke race when
arguing a case by indirectly implicating a defendant's race. A black male defendant
may be "Willie Hortonized" by a skillful prosecutor who persuasively characterizes
the defendant as a villain, causing the white jurors to fear that the defendant will
strike again if not convicted."7 In such cases, the resulting conviction often bears
little relationship to the alleged crime and the extent of the defendant's
participation in it. It is, instead, based more on the strong emotion aroused against
the accused.
E. Proving a Claim of Selective Prosecution
Having the right to file a motion claiming selective prosecution based on race
or other impermissible grounds offers little protection to a defendant. Indeed, the
trend of courts has been to increasingly limit the application of this remedy. Thus,
while selective prosecution cases initially arose in a non-criminal context, they
appeared at first to offer broad safeguards under an equal protection theory."8 In
Yick Wo v. Hopkins,"' one of the first selective prosecution cases, the Supreme
Court invalidated a facially neutral ordinance, holding that it was applied
discriminatorily against Chinese laundry operators while leaving white operators
unmolested." ° The Court held:
Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet
if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and
an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
116. For a general discussion of race and the O.J. Simpson trial, see Rory K. Little, Guilt,
Reasonable Doubt and the Reasonable Woman, 6 Hastings Women's L.J. 275 (1995); Cheryl I. Harris,
Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson and Susan Smith, Spectacles of Our Times,
35 Washburn LJ. 225, 233 (1996); Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal
Justice Process, and Magic Bullets, 67 U. Colo. L Rev. 989, 992 (1996).
117. David C. Anderson, Crime and the Political Hysteria (New York, Random House 1995);
Robert S. Blanco, Mixing Politics and Crime, 59 Dec. Fed. Probation 91 (1995).
118. For a detailed discussion of the historical development of selective prosecution claims, see
Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 55, at 1535-43.
119. 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064 (1886). Thomas W. Joo, New Conspiracy Theory of the
Fourteenth Amendment: Nineteenth Century Chinese Civil Rights Cases and the Development of
Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence, 29 U.S.F. L Rev. 353, 355 (1995) (arguing that the court's
holding in Yick Wo was based on protection of economic rights rather than a conscious intent to protect
the Chinese against racial discrimination).
120. Id. at 358, 373-74, 6 S. Ct. at 1065, 1072-73.
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their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution.
121
Despite the hope Yick Wo offered to defendants challenging discriminatory
practices on the part of prosecutors, the Court subsequently limited the scope of the
equal protection safeguards in both the civil and criminal contexts, replacing them
with a strict intent standard.
122
The selective prosecution doctrine also developed along racial and non-racial
lines. In the non-racial context, federal circuit courts were initially receptive to
evidence of disproportionate impact as proof of an equal protection violation. 1 As
the law in selective prosecution cases continued to develop, however, courts
rejected disproportionate impact as a means of proving discriminatory purpose.
Instead, courts began to hold that in order to prevail in these types of cases, the
defendant must meet a heightened standard by proving both discriminatory effect
and discriminatory purpose. 24
One of the first times the Supreme Court applied the two-pronged
discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose test to selective prosecution cases
occurred in Wayte v. United States." In that case the defendant, a vocal opponent
of the military draft, alleged discriminatory prosecution, claiming he was chosen
for prosecution in violation of his First Amendment rights because he wrote letters
to government officials, including the President, indicating that he had not and
would not register for the draft. 6 In support of his claim, Wayte presented
statistical evidence that more than 500,000 citizens failed to register for the draft,
yet only vocal non-registrants were prosecuted. 21 In rejecting Wayte's claim, the
Court employed the discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose standard.
28
The Court held that even if the passive enforcement policy had a discriminatory
effect, there was no evidence that the government purposefully prosecuted the
defendant and others because they were vocal objectors.
What is clear after Wayte is that a defendant must make aprimafacie showing
of discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose even before obtaining an
evidentiary hearing.' However, statistical evidence of disproportionate impact no
longer suffices to show discriminatory purpose. As one commentator notes,
121. Id. at 373-74, 6 S. Ct. 1072-73.
122. See Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 55, at 1536; Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S.
1, 8, 64 S. Ct. 397, 401 (1944).
123. See United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074, 1078-79 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616,617-24 (7th Cir.
1973) (en banc).
124. United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
125. 470 U.S. 598, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985); see Andrew H. Elder, Selective Prosecution for
Failure to Registerfor the Draft: Have First Amendment Rights Been Infringed?, 53 U. Cinn. L. Rev.
765 (1984).
126. 470 U.S. at 601, 105 S. Ct. at 1527.
127. Id. at 604-07, 105 S. Ct. at 1529-30.
128. Id. at 608 n.10, 105 S. Ct. at 1531 n.10.




"Because statistical evidence is often the only kind available to show intent or
purpose, the ruling on this sufficiency issue, as well as the strict requirements
concerning other thresholds of proof, have curtailed severely if not foreclosed the
selective prosecution defense."''
In terms of the proof required, defendants claiming racially selective
prosecution in charging are treated virtually the same as those claiming abuse of
prosecutorial discretion in the non-racial context and face the same burden of
showing discriminatory effect and purpose. Courts have consistently held that, even
in the context of race, statistical evidence is insufficient to establish intent to
discriminate even thoughjudges and prosecutors are unable to justify or explain the
disproportionate impact in charging decisions on any grounds other than race. In
fact, the Supreme Court has already considered and rejected the sufficiency of
statistical studies to support a black defendant's equal protection challenge to the
imposition of the death penalty. In McCleskey v. Kemp,'32 Warren McCleskey, a
black man, was sentenced to death for killing a white police officer during the
course of a robbery.'33 Relying on the statistical study of Georgia homicide cases
by Professor Buldus, McCleskey alleged that his death sentence violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The Supreme Court rejected this evidence of discriminatory death sentencing
patterns to prove intentional racial discrimination necessary to establish a claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment and held that a convict challenging a death
sentence had to prove that the prosecutor in his case consciously intended to
discriminate on the basis of race. 3 ' The Court also ruled that the results of
decisions by prosecutors over the course of many cases could not prove intentional
discrimination.'36 Justice Powell left the door open for a possible remedy by
131. Note, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Prosecution: The Effect of Announced Screening
Policies, 36 La. L. Rev. 1107, 1110 (1976); see also Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 55,
at 1542.
132. 481 U.S. 279, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
133. See id. at 287, 107 S. Ct. at 1764.
134. Id. Specifically, McKleskey relied on the following findings of the Baldus study, which were
noted by the court:
The "raw numbers" found by the Baldus study also indicate that killers of whites
received the death penalty in 11% of the cases while killers of blacks received it in only
1% of the cases. The "raw numbers" also indicated a "reverse racial disparity" based on
the race of the defendant: 4% of black defendants received the death penalty, compared
with 7% of whites. Baldus further found that the death penalty was applied in 22% of
the cases involving black defendants and white victims, 8% of the cases involving white
defendants and white victims, 1% of the cases involving black defendants and black
victims, and 3% of the cases involving white defendants and black victims. Regarding
prosecutorial choices, Baldus found that prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70%
of the cases involving black defendants and white victims, 32% of the cases involving
white defendants and white victims, 15% of the cases involving black defendants and
black victims, and 19% of the cases involving white defendants and black victims.
Id. at 286-87, 107 S. Ct. at 1764.
135. Id. at 291-92, 107 S. Ct. at 1766.
136. Id. at 292-95, 107 S. Ct. at 1766-67. See also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
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concluding that arguments about the persistent pattern of racially discriminatory
death sentencing were best left to legislative bodies who could fashion appropriate
responses. 3 In 1988, the Racial Justice Act was introduced in Congress in
response to the McCleskey decision.'38 Since that time, however, Congress has
failed to pass the Act. 39
III. U.S. v. ARMSTRONG: FURTHER NARROWING A DEFENDANT'S ABILrTY TO
SUCCESSFULLY ATTACK RACIALLY SELECTIVE PROSECUTION?
Although much of the writing in the area of racially selective prosecution
focuses on the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty based on the
defendant's race, these same concerns about prosecution based on race extend to
the decision to charge a defendant for narcotics violations. A defendant must still
make aprimafacie showing of discriminatory effect motivated by a discriminatory
purpose before obtaining an evidentiary hearing on claims. Defendants, in order to
establish a claim of selective prosecution, must also have access to discovery.
By way of example, this section briefly looks at the federal government's war
on drugs and, in particular, the criminal justice system which makes it imperative
that courts vigilantly monitor certain prosecution decisions, given that a
disproportionate number of black males are being charged, convicted, and
sentenced to imprisonment for narcotics violations."
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-67, 97 S. Ct. 555, 563-64 (1977) (holding that proof of discriminatory
purpose is required in claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
137. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 319, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987). Some commentators argue that
given the Court's history of requiring proof of discriminatory purpose, the McCleskey decision, from
a doctrinal perspective, was not surprising. See Randall L Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race,
Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388,1402-08 (1988). Kennedy argues
that "[e]xisting doctrine would not have made a contrary result implausible; had there been the will,
available precedent could have lit the way. The point is that the decision rendered, albeit lamentable,
was well within the ambit of expectations reasonably derived from prior rulings." Id.
138. H.R. 4442, 100th Cong., 2d Seas. (1988). For statements by Representative Conyers in
introducing the bill, see 134 Cong. Rec. El 174 (daily ed. A, Apr. 21, 1988). For a discussion of
Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to pass the Racial Justice Act, see
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1514 n.97 (2d ed. 1988); Note, Too Much Justice:
A Legislative Response to McCleskey v. Kemp, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L Rev. 437, 470-96 (1986)
[hereinafter Too Much Justice]; Matt Pawa, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights,
Can Congress Save Us?, An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U.P.A. L
Rev. 1029, 1086-91 (1993).
139. For a detailed discussion of the history of the RJA, see Lungren & Krotoski, supra note 64,
at 656-61. But see Don Edwards & John Conyers, Jr., The Racial Justice Act: A Simple Matter of
Justice, 20 U. Dayton L Rev. 669 (1995). H.R. 5269, 101 st Cong., 2d Seas. (1990). This version of the
RJA passed the House as a part of the Comprehensive Control Act of 1990 but was subsequently
dropped by the conference committee. The RJA was introduced and defeated in both the Senate and
House in 1991. See H.R. 1249, 102d Cong., 1st Seas. (1991); H.R. 2851. 102d Cong., 1st Seas. (1991).
The bill introduced in the House was renamed the "Fairneas in Death Sentencing Act." See 137 Cong.
Rec. 58300 (daily ed. June 20, 1991). The RJA was passed by the House in 1994 but died in
conference. See H.R. 4017, 103d Cong., 2d Seas. (1994).
140. Weatherspoon, supra note 86, at 31; Ed Wiley Ill & Sean Jensen, Black and Latino Males
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This section also looks at the Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in light of its holding in U.S. v. Armstrong.'4'
In Armstrong, the respondent challenged the government's decision to charge him
for federal rather than state narcotics offenses, and filed a motion for discovery in
support of his claim of selective prosecution. This section discusses whether the
Court's narrow interpretation of the rule was warranted or even necessary to
resolve the issues presented by the defendants and concludes that the court
unjustifiably and narrowly interpreted the rule. It does not definitively assert that
the defendants in Armstrong satisfied the threshold necessary to establish the right
to discovery. It does argue, however, that the Armstrong Court placed another
roadblock in the defendant's path, further closing the door on a defendant's
successful assertion of racially selective prosecution. Moreover, it asserts that the
Court created a new standard, a constitutional supplementation to Rule 16. This
section then concludes that the Court's interpretation of the rule may have
unfortunate consequences far beyond selective prosecution cases.
A. Selective Enforcement in the War on Drugs
Most Americans, regardless of their race, agree that the sale of illegal narcotics
needs to end."" In response to this concern, the federal government launched the
"war on drugs," implementing policies to end the sale of illegal drugs. The problem
is that black communities appear to be the primary targets of drug enforcement
decisions. And black men are the primary targets for arrest, generally receiving
higher sentences than whites for the same offenses. 3 One commentator argues that
the architects of the drug war specifically targeted blacks and Hispanics for the
benefit of whites." He maintains that the architects knew that drug use was
declining in the white communities but not among blacks and Hispanics, who
would, therefore, be the primary casualties of the war."'I
Although no evidence exists of a conspiracy designed specifically to destroy
minority communities, there is evidence that drug policies have detrimentally
impacted minorities, and, specifically, blacks. The Anti-Drug Use Act of 1986 and
subsequent legislation imposed extremely high penalties for the possession and
distribution of cocaine base (crack).'" These same provisions make a distinction
between powder cocaine, which is more prevalent among whites, and crack,
treating crack cocaine more severely. One gram of crack is the equivalent of 100
Suffer the Most in the War on Drugs, Scholar Says, Black Issues in Higher Educ., Aug. 12, 1993, at
9; United States Sentencing Commission, Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing
Policy 156 (1995).
141. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16;U.S.v. Armstrong, 517U.S. 457,116S. Ct. 1480.
142. Weatherspoon, supra note 86, at 30.
143. Id.; Davis, supra note 92, at 169-74.
144. Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment in America 82, 95-97 (1995).
145. Id. at 104.
146. See U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456, 476, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1492 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
100 Stat. 3207, 21 U.S.C. § 841-852 (1994).
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grams of powder cocaine. 7 The distribution of 50 grams of crack is punishable by
the same mandatory minimum sentence of ten years incarceration that applies to the
distribution of 5,000 grams of powder cocaine.4 8 The sentencing guidelines expand
the ratio of penalty levels above the mandatory minimums such that, for any
amount of crack cocaine, the guideline range is the same as if the offense involved
100 times the amount of powder cocaine. 49 As a result, the penalties for crack
offenders are three to eight times longer than for the same or similar powder
cocaine offenders. 5 '
It is clear that most of the burden of the elevated federal penalties falls on
blacks. Recent studies indicate that, while 65% of those who have used crack are
white, in 1993 they represented only four percent of the federal offenders convicted
of trafficking crack.' The majority of defendants convicted of all crack cocaine
offenses are black.55 During the first year and one-half of guideline
implementation, the sentencing disparity between blacks and whites grew such that
blacks received sentences averaging more than 40% longer than whites.
These disparities did not happen by chance. The discriminatory practices of
prosecutors, who have virtually unrestrained discretion in deciding whether to
charge, what to charge, whom to charge, and whether to offer pleas, undeniably
affected the outcome.'53 For example, a prosecutor whose case involves possession
of narcotics by a first-time offender has the option of resolving the case at
screening or charging the accused with possession. The prosecutor's decision will
mean the difference between diversion or probation or a prison sentence.154 Where
the charges are to be brought also plays a critical role in the sentence a defendant
receives. If the prosecutor decides to pursue narcotics offenses in federal court
rather than state court, the sentencing is generally far more harsh. The difference
147. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1994).
148. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (1994). Conviction
for simple possession of five grams of crack results in a mandatory five-year sentence. However, the
maximum sentence of possession of any quantity of other drugs is one year.
149. See United States Sentencing Commnssion, Guidelines Manual § 2D 1.1(c) (1995) [hereinafter
USSG].
150. United States Sentencing Commission, Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal
Sentencing Policy 145 (Feb. 1995) [hereinafter Special Report].
151. In 1993, 88.3% of federal prisoners convicted of trafficking were black, and 84.5% of federal
prisoners convicted of crack possession were black. Id. at 152-53. Conversely, in 1993, 32% of federal
prisoners convicted of trafficking powder cocaine were white, and 58% of federal prisoners convicted
of powder cocaine possession were white. Id.
152. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sentencing in the Federal Courts: Does Race Matter?, 6-7
(1993).
153. See generally David C. James, The Prosecutors's Discretionary Screening and Charging
Authority, 29 APR Prosecutor 22 (1995).
154. Davis, supra note 92, at 1671-72. See generally William J. Powell & Michael T. Cimino,
Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the Hen
House, 97 W. Va. L Rev. 373 (1994); Steve Y. Koh, Note, Re-Establishing the Federal Judge's Role
in Sentencing, 101 Yale L.J. 1109 (1992); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Guidelines, 81 Cal. L Rev. 1471 (1993); Elizabeth A. Parsons, Note, Shifting the Balance of Power:
Prosecutorial Discretion Under Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 Val. U. L Rev. 417 (1994).
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is particularly stark in the case of crack offenses where the impact of the decision
to prosecute in federal court falls largely on blacks.
Black defendants recently challenged prosecutorial decisions to proceed in
federal court, alleging racially selective prosecution.' In order to get an
evidentiary hearing on such claims, a defendant must meet a very high standard and
must have access to discovery. Unfortunately, recent decisions make it almost
impossible to obtain discovery in support of such claims. Section B discusses the
narrowing of the right to discovery and its impact on selective prosecution claims.
B. Interpretation of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
In U.S. v. Armstrong,56 nine black defendants charged with federal narcotics
offenses filed a motion for dismissal of the indictment, alleging that the
government prosecuted them in federal rather than state court because they were
black, while prosecuting all white defendants in state court. The decision to charge
the defendants with federal rather than California offenses had great significance.
If prosecutors had charged the defendants under California law, the minimum
sentence for selling more than 50 grams of crack would have been three years, and
the maximum five years." 7 However, because the federal prosecutors charged
defendants under federal law, the penalty range increased dramatically from ten
years to life.'58
In attempting to prove their allegation of racially selective prosecution
pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants
filed a motion for discovery. In their motion, they argued that the government was
required to turn over documents that included the government's prosecution
strategy for trying cocaine cases because the information was material to their
selective prosecution claims.'59 The Supreme Court rejected the claim on the basis
of Rule 16(a)(1)(C), which states in pertinent part:
Upon the request of the defendant the government shall permit the
defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents,
photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions
thereof which are within the possession, custody or control of the
government, and which are material to the preparation of the defendant's
defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at
the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.t"
The Supreme Court concluded that the only logical interpretation of the rule
was that it was intended to allow access to evidence necessary for use in the
155. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
156. Id. For a detailed discussion of U.S. v. Armstrong and its impact on the prosecutor's charging
decision, see Davis, supra note 55, at 42-50.
157. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 479 n.5, 116 S. Ct. at 1493 n.5.
158. Id. at 479, 116 S. Ct. at 1493.
159. Id. at 461-63, 116 S. Ct. at 1485.
160. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(A)(1)(C) (emphasis added).
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defendant's case in chief and not to support a selective prosecution claim. 6'
Nevertheless, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution fails to
support the Court's narrow interpretation of the term "defense" to include only an
accused's case in chief. The amendment provides that "[Iln all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence [sic]."' 62 The limitation on the meaning of "defense" is
found nowhere within the Sixth Amendment. In addition, there does not appear to
be any precedent to support the majority's conclusion.
The Court reasoned that its conclusion was supported by "perceptible
symmetry" between "documents material to the preparation of the defendants'
defense" and "documents 'intended for use by the government as evidence in chief
at the trial.""'16a The Court found that its interpretation was bolstered by section
(a)(2) of Rule 16, which excluded from defense inspection "reports, memoranda,
or other internal government documents made by the attorney for the government
or other government agents in connection with investigation or prosecution of the
case."'" The Court noted that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) permits a defendant to examine
documents material to his defense. In contrast, section (a)(2) prohibits a defendant
from examining government work product in connection with his case. 65 The Court
found that it would be implausible to interpret 16(a)(1)(C) and (a)(2) so as to give
the defendant the right to examine all prosecution work product except his own.' 66
The majority's narrow interpretation of Rule 16 is unwarranted and is not
supported by the rule's history. The advisory committee notes that the 1974
amendment to Rule 16 specifically states that the rule was revised to provide
greater discovery to both the prosecution and the defense. 6 Moreover, the Court's
discussion of perceptible symmetry is without merit. The Court makes much of the
rule's juxtaposing of the phrase "material to the preparation of the defendant's
defense" with the phrase "intended for use by the government as evidence in chief
at the trial" to establish that the evidence defendants sought was available only for
use in their case in chief. 168 However, the Court fails to employ basic grammar
principles in interpreting the rule.
Rule 16(a)(1)(C) uses "or" in setting forth the circumstances under which
defendants may have access to the prosecution's evidence. The plain and ordinary
meaning of "or" expresses an alternative, giving a choice of one among two or
more things. 69 To that end, the defense has the option of requesting specific
information either: "(1) because it is material to the defendant's defense or (2) if
the government intends to use the information in its case in chief at the trial, apart
161. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 462-63, 116 S. Ct. at 1485.
162. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
163. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 462, 116 S. Ct. at 1485.
164. Id. at 462-63, 116 S. Ct. at 1485.
165. Id. at463, 116S. Ct. at1485.
166. Id.
167. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, advisory committee's note.
168. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 462, 116 S. Ct. at 1485.
169. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, advisory committee's note.
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from the need to establish materiality, or (3) if the information was obtained from
or belongs to the defendant."' 70 The purposes are distinct, and one is not
inextricably tied to the other. This position finds support in the rule's history,
which states that the government is required to provide discovery "if any one of
three situations exists."'' It then allows the defendants access to specified
documents and information if: "(a) the defendant shows that disclosure of the
document or tangible object is material to the defense, (b) the government intends
to use the document or tangible object in its presentation of its case in chief, or (c)
the document or tangible object was obtained from or belongs to the defendant."''
It is clear from the history of the rule that it was not intended to limit access to
information to attack racially selective charging to the defense of a defendant's
case in chief.
The majority's reliance on 16(a)(2) to support its limitation on the rule is also
without merit. As noted in Justice Breyer's concurrence, the majority concludes
that since the defendant will need prosecution work product in proving a claim of
selective prosecution while the rule exempts discovery of work product, then the
rule embodies a limitation which makes it irrelevant to the defense efforts to
establish a selective prosecution defense."' However, the majority ignores that the
work product privilege is not absolute.'74 In the civil context, for example, work
product is discoverable upon a showing of necessity or justification.'" There is
nothing inherently more serious or mysterious about the criminal prosecution which
warrants an absolute exclusion of government work product from discovery by the
defense in racially selective prosecution cases. If a defendant makes the appropriate
showing, the information ought to be provided. In the final analysis, however, the
majority unnecessarily narrows Rule 16 by creating an onerous limitation on its
scope. The Court's holding has been followed in United States v. Turner.17 6
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 471-76, 116 S. Ct. at 1489-92 (Breyer, J., concurring).
174. See United State v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239, 95 S. Ct. 2160, 2170 (1975); 8 Charles A.
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2022, p. 324 (2d ed., 1994).
175. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 474, 116 S. Ct. at 1491; Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,510,67
S. Ct. 385, 393 (1947); Jeffrey F. Ghent, Development, Since Hickman v. Taylor, of Attorney's "Work
Product Doctrine," 35 A.L.R.3d 412,465-469 § 25 (1971); see Wright et al., supra note 174, at 324.
176. 104 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1997). In Turner, five black defendants charged with distribution of
cocaine alleged they had been selected for prosecution on crack cocaine charges because of their race
and sought discovery in support of this allegation. Id. at 1181. The court held that the defendants could
not rely upon the rule of criminal procedure relating to discovery. However, defendants could obtain
discovery if they made an appropriate threshold showing, producing some evidence that similarly
situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted but were not. Id. at 1184. But see United
States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 1998). In Jones, the court held that a black defendant was
entitled to discovery on a selective prosecution claim based on unprofessional behavior by white police
officers who arrested him and testimony implying that the local police department referred him for
federal prosecution because of his race. Officers who executed the planned arrest wore custom-made
T-shirts bearing the defendant's picture and the words "See ya, wouldn't want to be ya," and "going
back to prison." While in Mexico, one officer sent the defendant a postcard depicting a black woman
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Ironically, after concluding its discussion of Rule 16, the Armstrong majority
considered the possibility of a constitutionally related supplementation of the rule
which would authorize discovery." The Court indicated that "Itihe justifications
for a rigorous standard for the elements of a selective-prosecution claim thus
required a correspondingly rigorous standard for discovery in aid of such a
claim."'7 To justify this right of discovery, the Court required "some evidence
tending to show the existence of the essential elements" of a racially selective
prosecution claim.7 Applying the new standard to Armstrong, the Court
considered only whether the evidence presented "constitute[d] 'some evidence
tending to show the existence of the essential elements' of a [racially] selective
prosecution claim," including that the government failed to prosecute similarly
situated defendants of other races."r Even under the new standard, the Court
concluded that the evidence was insufficient to authorize constitutionally related
supplementation of Rule 16 discovery.'
What is clear after Armstrong is that a defendant must meet a very high
standard in order to establish entitlement to discovery. Yet without initial access
to discovery, defendants may never meet the burden of proving an equal protection
violation, that the prosecutor's charging decision had a discriminatory impact and
was motivated by discriminatory purpose. The Armstrong decision further
solidifies the prosecutor's right to exercise unrestrained decision-making power,
leaving defendants at the mercy of those prosecutors who charge based on race or
other constitutionally impermissible grounds. As a result, many blacks as well as
other minority defendants will continue to face the prospect of incarceration,
potentially for life in federal prison for crack cocaine offenses, while many white
defendants receive a minimum prison sentence for the same or similar offenses in
state court or are allowed to go free.
with a basket of bananas on her head with a note which read in part "chances are good you're going to
jail for a long time." While the district court found that the defendant did not meet its burden as to
selective prosecution, the court of appeals disagreed. It noted that while eight non-black defendants had
been prosecuted in state court for crack offenses, the defendant, his wife, and co-defendant were
referred for federal prosecution and while the defendant and his wife were taunted by T-shirts and
postcards, their white co-defendant was not. The court concluded that the defendants met the burden
set forth in U.S. v. Armstrong. Id. What is troubling is that the defendants produced an overwhelming
amount of evidence to support their claim. The officer's racial bias was blatant. In most instances,
however, such racial animus will be difficult to uncover, leaving the defendant without access to
discovery to prove his selective prosecution claim. In addition, the Armstrong decision is murky and
provides no real guidance as to what constitutes "some evidence" to allow a court to find a defendant
is entitled to discovery.
177. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468-70, 116 S. Ct. at 1488-89.
178. Id. at 468, 116 S. Ct. at 1488.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 470, 116 S. Ct. at 1489.
181. Id. See Anne B. Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing
Protection after United States v. Armstrong, 34 Am. Crim. L Rev. 1071, 1090 (1997) (suggesting
that even though the defendants in Armstrong did not prevail, such evidentiary hearings are useful
because they expose disparate treatment of some defendants in the legal process, which may lead to a
reduction in improper selective prosecution).
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Unfortunately, Armstrong may be instrumental in denying discovery in cases
other than those involving claims of racially selective prosecution. If read broadly,
the opinion could be interpreted to deny Federal Rule 16 authorization for
discovery into government documents that are material to the preparation of claims
which do not constitute "defenses" as defined by the Court. Among such claims are
claims for pre-indictment delay. 2 These claims are analogous to the racially
selective prosecution claims in Armstrong as both involve proof of discriminatory
effect and purpose.
The essential elements for pre-indictment delay claims are (1) substantial
actual prejudice to the defense at trial and (2) intentional delay for a tactical
advantage or some bad faith purpose. 3 What is important about such claims is that
a defendant must have access to discovery in order to uncover governmental tactics
and reasons for pre-indictment delay.
Arguably, a defendant would not have access to such information since it is
not material to his "case in chief," as required in Armstrong, and is merely
information sought pre-trial to support dismissal of an indictment. If the courts
decide to extend the holding in Armstrong, it will almost ensure a defendant's
inability to fully present his claim, leaving prosecutors to charge or refuse to charge
without accountability.
IV. SETTING REASONABLE LIMIs ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Many commentators and scholars recognize the need to narrow the broad
discretionary powers afforded prosecutors when deciding to charge defendants.
They suggest a number of measures which might help to rein in such broad
sweeping, yet rarely scrutinized, exercises of authority and bring some
accountability to prosecutors for their unethical decisions. This section looks at
some of these proposed solutions and the reasons these measures will have limited
success in controlling racially motivated prosecutions. Drawing from previous
proposals by commentators and scholars, this section makes suggestions which
might aid in controlling prosecutorial decision-making powers.
A. Internal Restraints
One possible resolution entails requiring prosecutors to prescribe and follow
internal regulatory procedures, policies, and guidelines.8 4 These regulations might
involve adopting detailed standards which guide the exercise of discretionary
182. For a discussion of pre-indictment delay, see Unites States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
183. Id. at 1500.
184. See Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 55, at 1550-1551.
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charging decisions and require written reasons for certain discretionary
decisions.'" This formal regulatory scheme could be used to oversee charging
decisions by testing the underlying regulatory policies for discrimination under an
equal protection theory."6 If the policy is deemed constitutional, the prosecutor's
announced policy could be compared with her conduct in a given case. Any
deviation from the prescribed policy might be enough to make a prima facie
showing of discriminatory prosecution, shifting the burden of proof to the
government to explain its actions. 7
Such guidelines might play an important role in reducing abuse of
prosecutorial discretion, yet their usefulness is limited. For example, guidelines
might be helpful in preventing non-racial selective prosecution cases where an
illicit motive is likely to be focused and more easily detectible., Following
carefully drafted guidelines adds credibility to a prosecutor's assertion that his
decision to prosecute was based on legitimate considerations. 9 However, racial
motivation flows from many sources, is often unconscious, and can potentially
affect every charging decision.'" As a result, one can never guarantee that a
prosecutor's decision does not have racial underpinnings.
Another proposed solution would require promulgation of written rules and
that a prosecutor obtain approval from a centralized authority before proceeding
with investigating or charging a case under these rules.' 9' The procedure would
assure efficiency and consistency in the prosecutor's office as well as protect a
defendant's right to detect and attack a rule which has not been followed.' 92 This
approach also has its disadvantages. It involves review by one unfamiliar with the
case; a prosecutor may manipulate the facts so as to convince the reviewing
authority of the need to prosecute; and due to matters such as size, staff, and
workload in a given office, the centralized standards may be both disruptive and
burdensome.'93
A similar procedural approach requires prosecutors to submit written reports
to their supervisors substantiating their charging and sentencing decisions.
However, the reasons may not be verifiable, or a prosecutor may provide so many
justifications for a decision that it is difficult to determine whether race was the
underpinning for a particular decision. 94
185. See id.; Abrams, supra note 24, at 57; Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal
Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. Chic. L Rev. 246,291-98
(1980); LaFave, supra note 46, at 537-38.
186. Note, United States v. Falk: Developments in the Defense ofDiscriminatory Prosecution, 72
Mich. L. Rev. 1113, 1122-23 (1974).
187. Vorenburg, supra note 55, at 1564; Fritz B. Ziegler, Note, The Right to Nondiscriminatory
Prosecution: The Effect of Announced Screening Policies, 36 La. L. Rev. 1107, 1113 (1976).
188. See Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 55, at 1538.
189. Id. at 1549.
190. Davis, supra note 92, at 1679.
191. See Kane, supra note 24, at 2308; Abrams, supra note 24, at 2-39.
192. See Frase, supra note 185, at 296-97.
193. Kane, supra note 24, at 2308; Abrams, supra note 24, at 56.




One solution for reining in prosecutorial powers would involve expansion of
judicial review of the prosecutorial decision-making process by drawing upon the
review process already in existence for administrative agency decisions.'95 There
is no separation of powers argument in the administrative review process, and there
is no legitimate justification for such a limitation in the context of prosecutorial
discretion.'" Moreover, if judges are competent to review administrative agency
decisions, they are no less competent in circumstances where one asserts abuse of
one's constitutional rights. "I Thejudiciary frequently argues that by implementing
a process of review, prosecutorial decision-making will hinder thejudicial process.
However, courts have been willing to review administrative agency decisions. One
commentator noted that such an argument "must yield to the need for control over
prosecutorial discretion to prevent its abuse. Protection of the criminal defendant's
right to be free from prosecutorial discrimination must rank above judicial
expediency."'"" However, the judiciary has been unyielding in its refusal to engage
in significant review of prosecutorial charging decisions. Absent a change, some
prosecutors will continue to abuse their discretionary charging powers in violation
of a defendant's constitutionally protected rights.
While many suggestions for controlling a prosecutor's discretion have been
rejected, recent proposals may not only be acceptable but also a feasible means of
imposing accountability on the prosecutors. One feasible means of monitoring
prosecutorial discretion is to allow closer scrutiny by the United States Department
of Justice through its watchdog department, the Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR). Over the last few years, the OPR has investigated several
complaints against government prosecutors, leading to discipline or forced
resignation of those prosecutors deemed to have engaged in misconduct.'" Crucial
to the success of this measure is the providing of easily accessible reporting
procedures by public and private complainants.' In addition, OPR case reports
should be available annually to ensure the OPR's credibility.' In fact, Attorney
General Janet Reno has been credited with putting pressure on the OPR to provide
reports for public and internal interests, noting that the "reports are important for
the department's credibility."'2 °'
reasons approach).
195. Kane, supra note 24, at 2309.
196. Id.
197. Id.; Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Law for
Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 473, 475 (1976).
198. Kane, supra note 24, at 2309-10.
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Along the same lines, a recent report by the General Accounting Office
indicates that there appears to be no enforcement priorities in many U.S. Attorneys'
offices. 3 In addition, the Department of Justice had no requirements for U.S.
Attorneys to measure their own effectiveness or the effectiveness of the U.S.
Attorneys' offices which were the subject of the report since it had no set process
for doing so. The reports recommended that there ought to be more accountability
for implementing priority programs. Establishing and following these priorities will
not only foster confidence in prosecutors but will also provide a means for a
defendant to challenge a prosecutor's charging based on race or other
impermissible grounds.' ° In addition, on November 26, 1997, Congress enacted
what has been called the Hyde Amendment, allowing criminal defendants who
have been both acquitted and vindicated after unreasonable prosecutions to recover
the costs of a defense they should not have had to incur.' For the first time
criminal defendants could ask the court to order the government to reimburse a part
of their attorney's fees and costs.2'
The Hyde Amendment extends the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which
provides fees to prevailing private parties in civil suits by or against the
government, to criminal cases. Any such awards will be paid for by the Justice
Department's budget.' Although opponents of the Amendment argue that it will
cost the taxpayers a fortune, such predictions are not supported by the awards in
civil cases. Nor are these predictions supported by the calculations of the
Congressional Budget Office, which estimates the maximum total cost would be
7.5 million dollars per year.20 8
203. See GAO-GGD 95-150, supra note 24, at 2-3.
204. Id.
205. Commerce, Justice & State Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, Tit. VI, §617, Il1 Star. 2519 (1998)
(The Provision can be found as a statutory note to 18 U.S. C. A. §3006 A). The Statute provides:
During fiscal year 1998 and in any fiscal year thereafter, the court, in any criminal case
(other than a case in which a defendant.is represented by assigned counsel paid for by the
public) pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, may award to a prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation expenses,
where the court finds that the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in
bad faith, unless the court finds that special circumstances make such an award unjust. Such
awards shall be granted pursuant to the procedures and limitations (but not the burden of
proof) provided for an award under section 2412 of title 28, United States Code. To
determine whether or not to award fees and costs under this section, the court, for good
cause shown, may receive evidence ex parte and in camera (which shall include the
submission of classified evidence or evidence that reveals or might reveal the identity of an
informant or undercover agent or matter occurring before a grand jury) and evidence or
testimony so received shall be kept under seal. Fees and other expenses awarded under this
provision shall be paid by the agency over which the party prevails from any funds made
available to the agency by appropriation. No new appropriations shall be made as a result
of this provision.
Id.





Opponents of the EAJA also argue that there will be a floodgate of
unwarranted litigation by those seeking fee awards.2' However, it is unlikely that
a defense lawyer would invest time and effort in these cases unless the court
seemed likely to find an underlying prosecution unreasonable.1 °
A final attack on the legislation is that it will force prosecutors to make
decisions based on their office budget rather than focusing their full attention on
doing justice.21' However, other areas of the law such as tort law, including
constitutional torts, demonstrate that the law "should provide financial
disincentives to harmful and unjustifiable conduct by the government and its
agents."2" What is crucial about the proposal is its recognition that there are not
adequate safeguards against abusive prosecutions. As House Judiciary Chairman
Henry Hyde points out, "If your government, your last resort, is your oppressor,
you really have nowhere to turn." '213 Even though the Amendment will not resolve
all abuses of discretion, it will at least give the government notice that in some
instances it will have to pay for its discriminatory charging practices.
Although the foregoing suggestions present some viable options for curtailing
prosecutorial abuses, they do not go far enough, particularly in light of the matter
of Rolando Cruz, where it is alleged that prosecutors intentionally acted to violate
his rights. As Professor Lawrence Marshall indicates, "There are some prosecutors
who will put innocent people on death row, who will frame people because they
sort of believe [they are] guilty, unless we create a system that will rein them in.
Our current system undervalues the fact, and it must be changed."214
Abuses by prosecutors appear to be rare. However, there are those who believe
that abuses of power happen more often than anyone can imagine, with little or no
consequences." 5 At least part of the problem is attributable to the absolute
immunity prosecutors presently have, which protects them from civil liability for
anything they do or say while in the courtroom. 216 Such immunity may lead some
prosecutors to cross the line separating ethical conduct from unethical conduct,
believing that crossing the line is justified to reach the proper outcome.217 This
209. Id.
210. Id. As of this date, there are no reported cases interpreting the Hyde Amendment.
211. Taylor, supra note 206, at 23, 26.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 26.
214. Terry Bums Copley, Lawyers: Too Many Bad Prosecutors, The State Journal Register, June
22, 1992, at 11.
215. Eye On America Takes a Look at the Misconduct of Prosecutors and How Many Innocent
People are Being Sent to Jail (CBS Evening News, Tues., June 1, 1999). News anchor John Roberts
interviewed a New Orleans attorney, Laurie White, who helped to reverse the convictions of nine men
and to free six of them from prison by showing that in each case prosecutors either withheld or had
evidence that pointed to the defendants' innocence. In one of the most egregious cases, prosecutors
convicted a black defendant for murder causing him to spend 27 years in prison. Despite statements
from two eyewitnesses, prosecutors withheld evidence that a white suspect was at the murder scene.
Unfortunately, of the nine cases where Laurie White found misconduct, not one prosecutor faced public
sanction.
216. Copley, supra note 214, at 11.
217. Id. (Noting that some prosecutors cross the line because they believe what they are doing is
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cloak of immunity should be removed, thus allowing prosecutors to be sued for
their intentional misconduct. The result would be that those prosecutors who are
inclined to violate a defendant's rights will have to pay for doing so.
In circumstances where the behavior is egregious, such as in the case of
Rolando Cruz, we must be willing to criminally charge those prosecutors who
purposefully pursue a wrongful prosecution. Unfortunately, such prosecutions are
rare. However, if they were to become more common, prosecutors would realize
that they will be judged by the very laws they are required to uphold.
The consequences for abuses of power could have been devastating for a
defendant like Rolando Cruz. However, experts simply do not believe that
criminally charging the prosecutors would have any repercussions beyond the
county where the offenses occurred. 18 But why should this be the expectation? If
we have judges, police officers, councilmen, and legislators in prison for criminal
wrongdoing, why is it that we are unwilling to acknowledge that prosecutors
commit criminal acts and should be subject to the same punishment?219 Some
prosecutors argue that the prospect of criminal sanctions will have a chilling effect
on the way prosecutors perform their duties.22° The possibility of criminal sanctions
will not have an impact on the overwhelming majority of state and federal
prosecutors who perform their duties with integrity. But this should be the result
for prosecutors who are inclined to abuse their power to gain a conviction.
V. CONCLUSION
The prosecutor's office has become the most powerful office in the criminal
justice system. 22' Nowhere is this power more evident than in the areas of charging,
plea bargaining, and sentencing.222 This article recognizes that in order for
prosecutors to effectively perform their duties, they must have discretion. However,
affording prosecutors such great autonomy in deciding whom to charge, whether
to offer a plea, and the appropriate sentence to seek also provides occasion for
prosecutors to cross the line of legitimate exercise of authority, leading to abuse of
discretionary power. Nowhere is this more evident than in the matter of Rolando
Cruz. While there are some restraints on the prosecutor's powers, these restraints
have not adequately protected those who assert they have been singled out because
of their race or for other impermissible reasons.
With regard to race, statistical studies which focus on the intersection of the
decision to prosecute overwhelmingly support the proposition that the race of the
defendant matters when prosecutors decide whether and what to charge. This is
particularly true in cases involving the decision to seek the death penalty and the
right. They believe they know who is guilty, and cross the line out of fear that the guilty person will be
exonerated).
218. Hansen, supra note 19, at 27.
219. Copley, supra note 214, at 11.
220. Hansen, supra note 19, at 27.




decision to file federal narcotics charges. Unfortunately, the courts have been
unreceptive to the use of these studies to establish that a prosecutor has engaged
in racially selective prosecution in a specific case. The Supreme Court has made
a defendant's allegation of racially selective prosecution even more difficult by
narrowing a defendant's right to discovery in support of such claims. We cannot
underestimate the discretionary power of prosecutors, particularly as they emerge
as real policy-makers in the criminal justice system.
Many solutions have been offered to rein in the prosecutor's discretionary
authority, which appears to be unreviewable, especially as it relates to the decision
to charge. Unfortunately, no one solution will resolve the issue. Perhaps a
combination of suggestions will come closer to drawing a line over which a
prosecutor cannot cross. Yet, until courts and legislatures relinquish their hands-off
approach and accept responsibility for setting policy for the reviewing of
prosecutorial decisions, those prosecutors who would abuse their power and pursue
citizens based on race or other impermissible grounds will continue to do so,
knowing that the odds of being sanctioned are slim to none. If we remove immunity
from civil liability that prosecutors presently enjoy and impose criminal sanctions
for intentional abuses of powers, prosecutors will realize that they are subject to the
same laws they are appointed to enforce.
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